This article analyzes the degree of convergence between the United States and the European Union regarding the structural role of administrative agencies. As will be argued, the United States and European Union have arrived at the same broad conclusion about a "nondelegation doctrine": delegations to administrative agencies should be permitted so long as some limiting principle governs the exercise of that power and allows for sufficient judicial review. However, the Supreme Court has taken a more permissive approach than the Court of Justice in defining the limiting principle. The United States has loosened the reins for the sake of modern administration while the European Union has maintained a firmer grip to keep better control over the Europeanization project. Stated another way, the nondelegation doctrine is simply a reflection of the systems' relative levels of integration. Thus, the nondelegation doctrine will be stretched in Europe as functional regulatory demands arise from wider and deeper integration. At the same time, the focus will be redirected from substantive limits to procedural controls; accordingly, this Note advocates for a European Administrative Procedure Act.
Introduction
"[I]n our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives."
I So stated the Supreme Court in Mistretta v. United States (1989) in upholding Congress's delegation of authority to the United States Sentencing Commission to promulgate federal sentencing guidelines.
Mistretta follows a long history of delegations surviving the nondelegation doctrine.
II
According to the purest form of this doctrine, Congress cannot delegate its legislative authority to another branch. III While the doctrine has been cited in judicial reasoning from time to time, it has not functioned to invalidate a statutory delegation since 1936. IV In fact, so long as Congress has provided an "intelligible principle" to guide agency action, a delegation will survive under the doctrine. This Note shall analyze, through comparative study, the degree of convergence between the two systems as regards the structural role of administrative agencies. The nondelegation doctrine will serve as the lens through which to view this role. As will be argued, the United States and European Union have arrived at the same broad conclusion about the nondelegation doctrine: delegations should be permitted so long as some limiting principle governs the exercise of that power and allows for sufficient judicial review.
However, while both systems allow delegations of power to agencies, the Supreme Court has taken a decidedly more permissive approach than the Court of Justice in defining the limiting principle. In the United States, the functional needs of the modern regulatory state have come to trump concerns for overly broad exercises of power by subsidiary bodies. Meanwhile, E.U. nondelegation doctrine has depended more heavily on the process Thus, although the Court acknowledged the intellectual foundation for a nondelegation theory, it did not resolve the precise contours of its operation.
XXI
The doctrine did not resurface until 1892 in Field v. Clark. XXII In Field, importers challenged the Tariff Act of 1890, which in part required the President to suspend provisions of the Act permitting free trade reciprocity and levy duties upon finding that a foreign nation imposed tariffs on certain goods. XXIII The importers argued that the statute impermissibly delegated legislative authority to the President. XXIV The Court did not view the statutory delegation in this case as a transfer of legislative authority; rather, since the legislation premised presidential action upon a congressionally defined condition precedent, the President exercised executive power when suspending the provision. XXV Yet, the Court stated that the fact that Congress "cannot delegate legislative power to the president is universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the [C]onstitution." XXVI The Court provided a slightly more substantive outline of the doctrine than the Wayman court, distinguishing between "the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law." XXVII At the same time, the Court seemed to undercut its nascent doctrine by carving out an exception for foreign affairs powers whereby the President should have broad authority to conduct trade policy. XXVIII The immediate exception-making premised on important policy grounds foreshadowed later developments of the doctrine resulting in permissive delegations.
The modern nondelegation test derives from J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) . As in Field, the Court in Hampton faced a constitutional challenge by importers to a presidential proclamation raising duties pursuant to the Tariff Act (this time, It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment-perhaps serious embarrassment-is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved. XLIX 
Curtiss-Wright

Nondelegation in the European Union
Nondelegation has been a concern in the European Union since its inception. In 1958, The consequences resulting from a delegation of powers are very different depending on whether it involves clearly defined executive powers the exercise of which can, therefore, be subject to strict review in the light of objective criteria determined by the delegating authority, or whether it involves a discretionary power, implying a wide margin of discretion which may, according to the use which is made of it, make possible the execution of actual economic policy. A delegation of the first kind cannot appreciably alter the consequences involved in the exercise of the powers concerned, whereas a delegation of the second kind, since it replaces the choices of the delegator by the choices of the delegate, brings about an actual transfer of responsibility. LXXII Thus, according to the Meroni doctrine, a subordinate body can exercise only clearly deal with threats to the Union's financial stability and accordingly must be able to temporarily restrict short sales. XCI Lastly, the court asserted that the E.U. legislature enjoys discretion in delegating the power to implement harmonizing measures, especially "where the measures to be adopted are dependent on specific professional and technical expertise and the ability of such a body to respond swiftly and appropriately." 
Analysis
With Whitman and Parliament and Council representing the current state of the nondelegation doctrine in the United States and European Union, respectively, it is possible to identify areas of convergence and divergence. First, simply put, each system has formulated a nondelegation doctrine. The courts have taken it upon themselves, as guardians of their constitutional documents, to craft a judicially cognizable standard for adjudging the proper roles of governmental branches. XCIII The very presence of a nondelegation doctrine in both systems implies a fundamental concern with upholding the structural integrity of the constitutional system. Accordingly, at its core, the nondelegation doctrine "is rooted in the principle of separation of powers . . . ." E -68 the power and in doing so specifically outlines the content and scope of the delegation, the court will likely uphold the delegation. XCV Viewed in this light, the Meroni doctrine seems to fit the pattern of "nondelegation canons" described by Cass Sunstein. XCVI Moreover, this rejection of a "strong" nondelegation doctrine reflects the fact that a total prohibition on delegation is "unworkable." XCVII Whether for reasons of legislative imprecision, lack of technical expertise, or acknowledging the inherent policy-setting roles imbued in executive and judicial functions, the legislature must possess enough leeway to delegate some degree of legislative power; the debate is in defining that degree.
XCVIII
Relatedly, courts in both systems have premised their nondelegation doctrines partly on the sufficiency on judicial review. The concern for the Community judicial system permeates the Meroni, Romano, and Parliament and Council judgments. In particular, the court's central distinction in Meroni between "clearly defined executive powers" and "discretionary powers" rested on the delegation's amenability to judicial review for overly broad policymaking authority. XCIX In fact, the distinction drawn in Field between policymaking discretion and executive authority closely tracks the key language in Meroni. 
Counterarguments
This Note has presented a comparative analysis of the nondelegation doctrine in the United States and European Union, broadly concluding that while both systems apply it with varying degrees of permissiveness, the doctrine must be placed into its historical and structural context to fully understand its contours. Before offering recommendations on the best way forward, it is necessary to address two likely retorts to this analysis. 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
As it stands, the E.U. delegation framework looks a lot like the early days of American Yet, to balance out a permissive delegation standard, steps can be taken to ensure adequate accountability. One suggested route, which the Parliament has investigated, is the creation of a Law of Administrative Procedure of the European Union, essentially an E.U.
A.P.A. CLIX Such a development could help guide agency action, allowing permissive delegation while simultaneously framing and limiting the operation of those powers.
Another option would entail a formal treaty amendment explicitly stipulating the permissible level of delegation to agencies. However, this option should be considered less desirable in view of the treaty's rather strict treatment of delegations to the Commission in Article 290 TFEU. Moreover, constitutionalizing a nondelegation doctrine, however loose, would lock in an inflexible standard that could hold back the functional evolution of the E.U. system. In addition, more effective legislative drafting would allow for more precise judicial review and could help avoid the application of nondelegation principles altogether.
Lastly, ensuring sufficient input legitimacy represents the key to giving broad delegations a (discussing the particular challenges for "vertical" constitutional review in the E.U. system when compared to "horizontal" constitutional review in the United States). On the contrary, that provision must be perceived as forming part of a series of rules designed to endow the competent national authorities and ESMA with powers of intervention to cope with adverse developments which threaten financial stability within the Union and market confidence. To that end, those authorities must be in a position to impose temporary restrictions on the short selling of certain stocks, credit default swaps or other transactions in order to prevent an uncontrolled fall in the price of those instruments. Those bodies have a high degree of professional expertise and work closely together in the pursuit of the objective of financial stability within the Union. (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the Vesting Clause grants "all" legislative power to Congress). Though Justice Scalia penned the 9-0 opinion in Whitman, his approach in earlier cases indicated greater hostility to delegated powers. See Bank One Chicago, N. A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (referencing the Vesting Clause and Lockean nondelegation, though discussing the doctrine in the context of legislative history as a form of delegation); see also Manning 1997: 698 ("If 
